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This is my recollection of the events leading up to the
accident.
It was approximately 1500B (local) on 27th September 1987
when all hell broke loose. There had been numerous call-outs
previously which proved to be nothing at all, so when the
"hot-line" started ringing there was very little reaction from
us. However this time the call wasn't to go on cockpit standby
like before, but rather a call to scramble immediately.
The letter I was writing went flying as I scrambled to get
into the cockpit. In a matter of minutes we were screaming
down the runway. I was lucky I was number two in the formation
as it was about 45 deg C outside and the take-off was
hair-raising. How numbers three, four, five and six got
airborne I don't know.
After take-off we remained low level and set heading for
the combat zone. It was our intention to remain low level for
as long as possible to avoid being detected by the Angolan
radars.
The order came to pitch about 10 minutes after take-off and
up we soared like homesick angels. We levelled of at about 30
000' and the mission controller sounded like a horse racing
commentator with all the instructions he was giving us to
intercept the targets. Next came the order to jettison the
drop tanks. This command was a little strange for me, because
one never throws the tanks away in training so only when I saw
a 1 200 litre tank falling away from the lead aircraft did I
know this was no training sortie. It was serious. The
adrenaline was flowing.
The next thing I saw was a Mig 23 flying through the
formation about 300' below us. My first reaction was WOW what
a great looking aircraft. This was the first time I had seen
one in the flesh so to speak. When he started turning only
then did I see the second Mig. I called the engagement and
started turning. I was doing Mach 1.3 (about 1600 km per hour)
and he was going like hell so the turn was so wide I almost
lost sight of him.

This where I get a little frustrated. For 10 years I have
trained for this day and the majority of the fight I cannot
recall. WHY! Anyway the next thing I remember is this Mig
coming head on at me from about my one, two o'clock position.
Still turning towards him I remember flicking the trigger
safety over to the cannon position. If he was going to fly
through my sights I was going to squeeze off a few rounds.
Unfortunately for me he got off the first shot.
There was a bright orange flash from his left wing and then
this incredibly fast telephone pole came hurtling towards me
trailing a solid white smoke trail. What more is that it was
cork screwing so I was never sure where it was going.
In all our training we were taught to break towards the
missile. This could or should create a tracking problem for
the missile and cause it to possibly overshoot.
But faced with reality I found it took a lot of willpower
to fly towards something I knew was trying to kill me.
However, I kept breaking towards it and I watched it corkscrew
over my right wing and disappear behind me. I thought it had
missed until I heard a dull thud and felt a light bump on the
aircraft. I immediately scanned all the gauges but there was
not indication of any damage. When I looked up again the Mig
flew over the canopy and disappeared behind me as well.
I immediately informed the leader that I thought I might
have been hit and his reaction was: "OK let’s go home." I did
not need a second invitation and I rolled the aircraft onto
its back and headed for the ground. With hindsight it appeared
that the whole fight lasted no more than 60 seconds from the
time we pitched until I got the ‘go home’ command.
This is perhaps where I got a fright for the first time. I
had not retarded the throttle any and I was rushing at the
ground in a vertical dive. When I pulled the stick into my
stomach to recover from the dive all that initially happen was
the aircraft changed attitude but not direction. The momentum
was so great the aircraft carried on descending. Just when I
thought that this is the end of me, the aircraft bottomed out
just above the trees.

With all this rolling and diving I was separated from my
leader and had no idea where he could be. Just then I started
getting a radar warning audio in my helmet from my 6 o’clock
(from behind). Some radar was looking at me. Was it the anti
aircraft batteries or was it the Mig? I radioed to the boss
that I thought someone was behind me. His reaction was to tell
me get as low as I can, as fast as I can and not to turn to
look behind me. My first reaction was - I was so low I was
raising a dust cloud like those crazy American Road Runner
cartoons. The leader said he could not see any dust trails so
I eased the aircraft lower. The radio alt read 50' and the
speed approximate 730-740 knots.
At this stage I was beginning to think that I’d
over-reacted and that I might not have been hit. Had I got out
of the fight too early? The aircraft was performing as if
there was nothing wrong with it. No vibrations and no handling
difficulties. Oh well tomorrow I'll be back I thought. It was
now about five minutes later and halfway home when the first
warning light flashed on. EP pump failure. Instinct must have
taken over because I thought my first reaction was to call the
boss and tell him I have a failure. He pulled out his
emergency checklist, and started reading the failure
procedures for me. That is when I realised that all the
necessary switches had been set. I don't remember doing them.
While he was reading the EP pump failure I got the second
failure, a right hand fuel pump failure. This is not too
serious under normal operating conditions as the engine can
gravity feed. While the boss was reading the fuel pump failure
procedure and I was confirming that they were done the
following light on the warning panel appeared. A HYD 2 system
failure.
This caused a little concern initially as the aircraft's
main systems use hydraulic fluid. Undercarriage, flaps,
controls, airbrakes and of course wheel brakes. After a quick
and careful analysis of the situation I relaxed a little. The
HYD 2 system is basically a standby system for the main HYD 1
system. All I had really lost with the HYD 2 failure was the
nose-wheel steering. It could have been worse.
By now we were far enough away from the combat zone and the
dangers associated with it, so I started to climb to try and
conserve fuel.
The next thing that happened is that I was getting an audio
warning but no visual warning when I looked at the panel. The
hours of simulator training came into action - a pending OIL
failure. This concerned me a little more than the rest of
them. There are two critical components that use oil. The
throttle and the nozzle flaps on the engine.
Flying the aircraft on the emergency throttle (electrically
operated) is not easy. The throttle is very slow and
unresponsive.
At this time the leader pulled in next to me to inspect for
any damage. He reported that there was fuel leaking out the
aircraft and that the drag chute was missing. As he said that,
the 500 litre warning light came on. The fuel gauges still
read 1700 litres so now which one is right. A little more
pressure was applied onto little old me.
Landing a perfectly serviceable aircraft on a 7500' runway
requires some work. I was going to have to do it on emergency
throttle and without a drag chute - a task I felt I could
handle.
I planned to land the aircraft short on a new stretch of
runway that was being constructed. This would give me an
additional 500' to play with on the landing roll. I got her
down at the threshold but when I applied the brakes the only
thing that happened was the expression on my face changed. I
pulled the nose higher so that there would be some form of
aerodynamic braking but this did not help. About a 1500' from
the end of the runway I applied the emergency hand brake with
little effect. The arrester-bed or sandpit at the end of the
runway was my next hope of stopping this machine.
The aircraft went through the arrester bed like a hot knife
through butter. No braking effect whatsoever. The next
'obstacle' was the security fence.
Where does ones sense of humour come from in at a time like
this? I was about to go AWOL (absent without leave) with a
multimillion rand aircraft. The board of enquiry is probably
going to ask me who authorised this illegal departure from the
security area. At the same time I was scared I was going to
drown in the river just beyond the fence. My seat has a land
survival pack in it and not an inflatable dinghy!!
When I went through the fence I remember putting my hands
in front of my face. It was at this precise moment that there
was a loud bang. I remember smelling cordite or gunpowder and
then everything went black. I felt the rush of wind over my
face and the feeling of silk on my cheek. With hindsight I
realised that when the ejection seat went off, my helmet must
have come off as well and the silk I felt on the cheek was the
ejection seat's stabilising parachute and not my personal
parachute.
When I regained my senses I was lying in the sand on my
right hand side. The first thing I attempted to do was to roll
onto my back and when I pushed on the sand with my left arm
there was this incredible piercing pain in my arm. The left
arm was broken just above the elbow. I then looked down at my
legs to see why they had not moved and I could not feel them
at all. I realised that the ejection seat was still strapped
to my back and thought that this might have something to do
with the lack of movement in my legs. I had no idea that the
neck was dislocated.
I then started looking around and the first thing I saw was
that I was lying directly in front of my aircraft. Here was a
F1 Mirage pointing straight at me. The problem wasn't that the
aircraft was pointing at me but rather that there was a fire
just behind the left air intake. I know there is a fuel tank
there but even worse was the fact that the ammo bins (with
over a hundred rounds of 30mm ammunition) was just under the
fire. If those rounds started going off I was in the line of
fire.
When the fire brigade arrived on the scene they naturally
came to my aid first. My immediate advice to them was that no
one touches me until a doctor pitches up and that they
immediately tend to the fire on the aircraft. There is no way
that I want to be shot at by my own aircraft.
When the doctors arrived with the ambulance my first
concern was they treat my arm for pain, then they can worry
about the rest. Even after 2 morphine injections there was
still not relief from the pain. I was later told that the
adrenaline in the body was so high that the morphine had no
effect.
Just before they pushed me into the back of the ambulance I
passed out only to wake up in 1 Military Hospital in Pretoria
10 days later.
It was another seven months before I left the hospital with
a C6, C7 fracture of the neck and permanently confined to
using a wheelchair. |